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INTRODUCTION 
 
Minority nationalist parties across Western Europe were among the most vociferous 
advocates of a “Europe of the Regions” in the 1980s and early 1990s. The building of an 
internal market, the reform of the European Structural Funds in 1988, and several 
innovations contained in the Maastricht Treaty of European Union – the creation of a 
Committee of the Regions, access for regional representatives to the Council of Ministers 
and the principle of subsidiarity -  were some of the developments hailed by these actors 
as evidence that a very different kind of European polity was being built, one which 
would see Europe’s small nations and regions assume a central role in the process of 
governing Europe (Keating, 1995). Academic observers may have been quick to 
appreciate the limitations for the emergence of such a regionalised Europe (Hooghe and 
Marks, 1996; Christiansen, 1996), but for minority nationalist parties, these developments 
were important for two reasons. Firstly, European integration seemed to be weakening 
the state - the traditional adversary of minority nationalism – by transferring many of its 
functional responsibilities to the supranational level, and by bringing sub-state actors into 
the European policy-making process. Secondly, European integration was creating a new 
political arena beyond the state onto which aspirations for national self-determination 
could be projected; national self-determination suddenly seemed to be far more 
achievable than it ever had been within the traditional confines of the centre-periphery 
relationship.  
 
As a result of these dynamics, many minority nationalist parties re-framed their long-term 
constitutional goals to take this new European dimension into account. The exact 
expression given to this regionalist vision differed from party to party; the idea of a 
Europe of the Regions proved to be an extremely malleable concept in the hands of 
different minority nationalist parties. In the 1980s, the Volksunie in Belgium linked its 
demands for the federalisation of Belgium to a broader project for a regionalised Europe 
constructed upon national communities (Lynch, 1996: 121-129). By 1990, Plaid Cymru in 
Wales was calling for “full national status” for Wales within a Europe of the Regions 
(Elias, 2006), while the Scottish National Party adopted a more sovereigntist position that 
demanded “independence in Europe” (Lynch, 1996; Hepburn, 2006). In Catalonia, 
Convergència i Unió outlined a vision of Catalonia within a plurinational Spain and a 
regional Europe, within which member states would coexist with subnational authorities 
on an equal level (Giordano and Roller, 2002: 103-106). Indeed, this European 
regionalist thematic was the defining feature of growing levels of support for European 
integration among minority nationalist parties throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the 
supranational level, a new shared interest in advocating this alternative vision of a future 
Europe led to the creation and consolidation of the European Free Alliance on the 
European level, a European party family created from scratch to represent a political 
agenda anchored in shared commitment to a Europe of the Regions (Lynch, 1996; De 
Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002).  
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And yet, in recent years, minority nationalist parties have been forced to recognise that a 
Europe of the Regions has not materialised. In the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
many of the demands put forward by EFA on behalf of Europe’s minority nations were 
rejected for inclusion in the final constitutional text; the resultant European Constitution 
was represented a “robustly statist” (MacCormick, 2004: 342) vision of the EU whose 
powers are conferred on it by sovereign Member States. Commenting on this failure, 
Jordi Pujol, long-serving President of the CiU and the architect of its European vision, 
recently observed with respect to the status of minority nations within the EU, that “the 
situation today is one where we have lost some of the gains made over the last few 
years...we have lost momentum” (Pujol, 2005). Hepburn (2007) also identifies a new 
wave of Euro-scepticism among parties that have traditionally articulated their territorial 
aspirations in European regionalist terms. These recent developments in European 
integration give rise to important questions with regard to minority nationalist party 
attitudes towards European integration. Does the failure to construct a Europe of the 
Regions, and the re-assertion of state authority within the EU, signal the end of minority 
nationalist party support for European integration? Are minority nationalist parties 
abandoning their regionalist visions of a future Europe, and looking elsewhere for ways 
of securing self-determination for their nations?  
 
This paper argues that even though in the current climate of European integration, the 
prospects for a Europe of the Regions are dismal indeed, it is too soon to herald the end 
of minority nationalist support for European integration. The paper draws on evidence 
from two case studies – of Plaid Cymru in Wales, and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego in 
Galicia – to argue that minority nationalist party support for European integration is 
much more complex than a simple assessment of whether European integration is 
moving closer towards, or further away from, the Europe of the Regions ideal. The 
argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basis of minority nationalist party support 
for a regionalist Europe in Wales and Galicia is examined; it is demonstrated that, even 
though both Plaid Cymru and the BNG had adopted the rhetoric of a regionalised 
Europe by the mid 1990s, they did so for very different reasons. As well as developments 
in European integration during the 1980s and early 1990s, minority nationalist party 
support for a Europe of the Regions was also driven by a basic ideological commitment 
to European co-operation (in the case of Plaid Cymru) and the specific dynamics of party 
competition at home at the time (Plaid Cymru and the BNG). 
 
If initial minority nationalist party support for a Europe of the Regions can be 
understood as the result of the combined influence of these three factors – developments 
in European integration, basic party ideology and domestic political dynamics – then the 
more recent attitudes of these actors towards Europe are also best understood as a 
product of these different influences. The second step of the argument, therefore, 
suggests that in recent years, minority nationalist party attitudes towards Europe in Wales 
and Galicia have changed in two distinct ways: they have become more critical of 
concrete developments on the supranational level, and they have downplayed the 
European regionalist dimension to nation-building that had framed party rhetoric since 
the mid 1990s. While the first trend can be explained as a result of the failure of 
European integration to move in a direction of a Europe of the Regions, understanding 
the second trend requires a consideration of the altered domestic political context within 
which Plaid Cymru and the BNG currently operate, a context which has made it 
increasingly difficult for both parties to flaunt their European regionalist credentials as 
confidently as they did ten years previously. The paper concludes, however, by suggesting 
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principle for a regionalised Europe. Minority nationalist parties who are ideologically 
committed to the principle of a regional Europe, such as Plaid Cymru, will find it very 
difficult to turn their back on Europe completely, as this would violate a core tenet of 
party identity. For other parties where the notion of a Europe of the Regions is less 
deeply rooted in the party’s mindset, like the BNG, abandoning Europe in favour of 
alternative avenues for securing autonomy for the minority nation is potentially much 
easier.  
 
 
THE RISE AND FALL OF EUROPEAN REGIONALISM IN WALES AND 
GALICIA 
 
By the mid 1990s, the positions adopted by Plaid Cymru and the BNG on the European 
issue were representative of those adopted by the majority of the minority nationalist 
party family: support for European integration expressed in European regionalist terms. 
Both Plaid Cymru and the BNG enthusiastically embraced the principle of a Europe of 
the Regions as an alternative framework within which Welsh and Galician self-
determination could be achieved, albeit with different conceptualisations of the exact 
form such a regional Europe would assume in practice. At its annual Conference in 1990, 
Plaid Cymru held the first serious debate of its long-term constitutional aims since the 
1950s, with the result that a commitment to greater Welsh autonomy within a Britannic 
confederation was replaced with “full national status for Wales in Europe” as the party’s 
ultimate goal for the Welsh nation (Elias, 2006). Over the next few years, the party 
developed a detailed framework setting out the different stages for achieving this 
constitutional objective, anchored in the assumption that European integration would 
continue with the process already under way of re-distributing political authority upwards 
to the supranational level and downwards to the level of the regions and the minority 
nations themselves.
1 Whilst sovereign states would ultimately disappear in Plaid Cymru’s 
vision of the future European polity, the BNG offered a less “post-sovereigntist” 
(Keating, 2001) version of a regional Europe within which different “peoples” would 
assume equal status and rights along side existing states within the EU. From 1994 
onwards, the BNG began calling for greater autonomy for Galicia within a plurinational 
Spain and a Europe of the Peoples, as an alternative to the neo-liberal Europe of States 
that had existed up to that point (Elias, 2006a: 151). For the most committed 
Europeanists within the party, a Europe of the Peoples meant “a European 
confederation of nations, a Europe without frontiers where nations have the right to self-
determination”, within which Galicia would take up its place alongside Europe’s other 
minority nations (Toro, 1991: 357). In 1998, the BNG established new links with the 
Catalan CiU and Basque PNV under the name Galeusca, one of the shared aims of the 
alliance being that of building a Europe of Peoples (De Blas Guerrero, 1998).  
 
In recent years, however, the attitude of both Welsh and Galician minority nationalist 
parties towards European integration has been characterised by two distinct trends. 
Firstly, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG have proposed more critical evaluations of the 
nature and direction of the process of European integration. Plaid Cymru, for example, 
was quick to realise the limited potential of the Committee of the Regions as a platform 
for representing regionalist issues on the supranational level, but there were also many 
other disappointments in store for the party throughout the 1990s. These included the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Plaid Cymru (1995) A Democratic Wales in a United Europe. Cardiff: Plaid Cymru, p. 4. 
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reform, and the failure of the principle of subsidiarity to translate into a meaningful 
redistribution of policy competences across different territorial layers within the EU 
(Elias, 2006: 106). Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe had brought several 
member states into the EU with populations smaller than that of Wales, but there was 
little prospect of a similar status being extended to other small nations already in the EU 
as part of larger Member States. Similarly, the European Constitution was perceived by 
the party as a confirmation of the fact that the European polity that existed at the 
beginning of the 21
st century was very much a Europe of States, rather than a Europe of 
the Regions. For its part, the BNG had always maintained a more critical stance towards 
the concrete policy and institutional realities of European integration, especially the 
economic disadvantages for the Galician economy within the European free-market 
(Elias, 2006a: 152-253). The BNG also shared many of Plaid Cymru’s frustrations at the 
lack of progress towards improving the institutional and legal recognition of Europe’s 
small nations and regions. Most recently, however, the BNG’s dissatisfaction with the 
general direction of European integration came to the fore in the campaign for the 
referendum on the European Constitution held in Spain in February 2005. The BNG 
campaigned in favour of rejecting the European constitution, since the proposed text did 
not give sufficient legal or political recognition of Europe’s minority nations and their 
languages, and failed to ensure greater social cohesion and the protection of workers’ 
rights.
2 For both Plaid Cymru and the BNG, therefore, enthusiasm for a Europe of the 
Regions has given way to a more pessimistic evaluation of the future prospects of 
securing regional autonomy within a European framework.  
 
Alongside this growing disillusionment with European integration, a second trend that 
can be identified in the European positions adopted by Plaid Cymru and the BNG is, 
paradoxically, the playing down of the European dimension to these parties’ nation-
building rhetoric. As European integration has become more problematic for these 
parties, the issue of Europe has also become a less salient feature of minority nationalist 
politics in Wales and in Galicia. The dumbing down of the European dimension has 
been most striking in the case of Plaid Cymru; since the late 1990s, the party has ceased 
to flaunt its European credentials at every opportunity, both as the marker of Plaid’s 
difference vis-à-vis its political competitors, and as the starting point from whence all its 
policy concerns depart. Any mention of Europe was deliberately eschewed during a re-
branding exercise undertaken by in 2006, which saw the party change its name and adopt 
a new logo.
3 European integration was also not on the agenda for discussion when a six-
month policy consultation process with the people of Wales was launched at the same 
time.
4 A similar turning away from Europe is apparent when one considers the salience 
of the European issue for the BNG. Strikingly, the 2004 European Parliament election 
and European Constitution referendum aside, the issue of Europe has ceased to feature 
in the BNG’s approach to the day-to-day business of politics. It is not an issue that has 
been discussed at any of the party’s Annual Conferences since the end of the 1990s, and 
was not a broader theme for the party’s campaign for the 2005 Autonomous Elections in 
Galicia. This is in stark contrast to the party’s campaign in the Autonomous Elections 
                                                 
2 BNG Press release, ‘O BNG recomenda o non ao Tratado Europeo dende o seu inequívoco si a Europe’, 18th 
December 2004. Found at: http://www.bng-galiza.org/ (accessed 12th February 2005). 
3 Since 1933, Plaid Cymru’s logo was three green peaks, representing Plaid Cymru’s key values, self-government, 
cultural prosperity and economic prosperity. More recently, a red dragon was added onto the three peaks. The new 
logo adopted by the party in 2006 was a yellow poppy, and the party will no longer use the word “Cymru” - Welsh for 
Wales – in the party’s name, referring to itself simply as “Plaid” (although its full name remains “Plaid Cymru - The 
Party of Wales”). 
4 See the campaign’s specific web-site, http://www.www2007.info (accessed 23rd July 2006). 
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packaging for the BNG’s detailed policy programme for Galicia. Thus, not only have 
minority nationalist parties in Wales and Galicia become more critical of European 
integration, but it is also the case that these parties seem to have become less interested 
in European integration. 
 
It should be noted, however, that despite a growing dissatisfaction with the current 
reality of European integration and the declining salience of the European dimension in 
these parties’ nation-building discourses, that neither Plaid Cymru nor the BNG have 
abandoned their commitment in principle to a regional Europe. Plaid Cymru remains 
formally committed to a constitutional future that inextricably links Welsh self-
determination to European integration. Thus, for example, the party’s 2005 General 
Election manifesto stated that “Plaid Cymru’s...ambition for Wales is independence in 
Europe. This would involve full national status for Wales within international 
organisations such as the UN and the EU”.
5 The party also noted its committed to 
further integration in areas of foreign policy, agricultural and food regulation, 
environmental protection and waste management, social policy and linguistic rights.
6 
Similarly, throughout its campaign in the referendum on the European Constitution, the 
BNG was keen to hammer home that its criticism of the constitutional text was 
advanced from a basic position of supporting European integration in principle – a 
“Europeanist No”, to quite the party’s own articulation of its position. 
 
In order to understand these recent trends in the attitudes of Plaid Cymru and the BNG 
towards the EU, it is necessary to begin by understanding the different reasons for which 
minority nationalist parties supported European integration in the first place. 
Understanding the origins of each party’s support for European integration provides the 
necessary background for examining the changing nature of party attitudes towards 
European integration in more recent years. The following section, therefore, examines 
the basis of minority nationalist party support for a Europe of the Regions in Wales and 
in Galicia. As suggested in the Introduction, most explanations of these actors’ pro-
European attitudes highlight the importance of developments on the supranational level 
from 1980s onwards in convincing minority nationalist parties of the potential for 
building an alternative regional Europe. The case studies of Plaid Cymru and the BNG 
suggest, however, that two other factors must also be taken into account in order to 
explain the growing enthusiasm of minority nationalist parties for a Europe of the 
Regions: basic party ideology and domestic political dynamics. It is to examine the 
interaction between these three factors – developments in European integration, basic 
party ideology and domestic political dynamics – as the drivers of minority nationalist 
party support for Europe, that this paper now turns. 
 
 
EXPLAINING MINORITY NATIONALIST SUPPORT FOR A EUROPE OF THE 
REGIONS IN WALES AND GALICIA 
 
Plaid Cymru was established in 1925, and from the outset was a party that defined Wales 
as a European nation. Saunders Lewis, one of Plaid Cymru’s first Presidents and most 
influential intellectuals, once stated that “Wales can understand Europe, for she is one of 
the family”, based on Wales having been a part of the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle 
                                                 
5 Plaid Cymru (2005) We Can Build a Better Wales. Cardiff: Plaid Cymru, pg. 8. 
6 Plaid Cymru (2004) Fighting Hard for Wales. Cardiff: Plaid Cymru.  
 6Ages.
7 Indeed, based on this historical experience, Lewis argued that Plaid Cymru’s long-
term aim for Welsh self-determination could only be achieved within some kind of over-
arching European framework. This basic constitutional principle rested on a specific 
understanding of autonomy that rejected independence as the ultimate goal of Welsh 
nationalism, in favour of a non-sovereign status which would provide Wales with the 
“freedom” to organise its own political and cultural affairs (Wyn Jones, 1999: 176). These 
two principles – Wales as a European nation and a rejection of sovereign independence – 
have underpinned Plaid Cymru’s constitutional policies ever since.  
 
Despite this commitment to European co-operation in principle, however, Plaid Cymru 
was initially extremely hostile to the predominantly economic nature of the EEC as it had 
developed until the 1970s. The party even voted against continued British membership 
of the EEC in a referendum held in 1975, on the grounds that Welsh interests would be 
poorly represented within the European institutions, and that the common market risked 
exacerbating the under-performance of a traditional Welsh economy on the periphery of 
the European continent (Turner, 1998: 75; Elias, 2006a: 87-88).  
 
The party’s change of heart on the issue of European integration by the end of the 1980s 
happened as a result of two factors. Firstly, developments in European integration 
convinced Plaid Cymru that the fundamental nature of the European project was 
changing; a EEC defined by market-driven initiatives appeared to be giving way to new 
concerns not just to ensure better representation of Europe’s cultural and linguistic 
groups, but also with issues such as environmental sustainability that resonated with Plaid 
Cymru’s own policy priorities. Secondly, these supranational developments acquired a 
particular significance because they offered a way out of the political crisis that Plaid 
Cymru was experiencing at the beginning of the 1980s. In a referendum held on the 1
st 
March 1979, the Welsh electorate had rejected proposals for devolution for Wales, a 
policy closely associated with Plaid Cymru’s political agenda. In a General Election a few 
months later, a Conservative government was elected to power that had little time for the 
demands of Welsh nationalism. At the end of 1979, it seemed that Welsh nationalism 
was in full retreat (Morgan, 1998: 407). However, throughout the 1980s, Plaid Cymru 
successfully used the European regionalist theme to carve out a new political space 
beyond the state. Linking issues of Welsh identity with European integration served to 
distinguish Plaid Cymru from increasingly unpopular Conservative government intent on 
re-asserting a strong sense of Britishness and defending British sovereignty, both themes 
that were anathema to the large swathes of voters on the Scottish and Welsh peripheries 
(Leydier, 1994: 1050). Moreover, the abstract notion of a Europe of the Regions 
constituted a rhetorical empty vessel into which other policy commitments – nuclear 
disarmament, sexual equality and environmental sustainability – could be poured. The 
result, as Wyn Jones (1996: 49) argues, was to make Welsh nationalism appear “not only 
relevant, but also progressive”. Plaid Cymru’s turn towards Europe, therefore, was 
rooted within the political crisis suffered by the party at the beginning of the 1980s; the 
notion of a Europe of the Regions provided an attractive discursive resource for the re-
branding of Welsh nationalism as an alternative political force within Welsh and British 
politics. By the end of the 1980s, Plaid Cymru’s ideological Europeanism had been 
translated into a concrete political project that made sense in the context of European 
and domestic politics at that particular point in time.  
 
                                                 
7 Lewis, Saunders (1926) Egwyddorion Cenedlaetholdeb. Machynlleth: Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru. 
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operation, the BNG has a history of deep ideological opposition to European 
integration. The BNG was created in 1982, as a political front that brought together 
different Marxist-Leninist and social-democratic political groups that had emerged during 
the latter years of the Franco dictatorship to demand greater autonomy for Galicia 
(Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, 1996; Barreiro Rivas, 2003). For the next fifteen years, the 
party’s attitude towards Europe was an extension of the radical left-wing rhetoric of the 
majority of its membership. The EEC was interpreted as a project designed and run by 
capitalist imperialists, and membership of the European club would only further 
exacerbate the economic and political neglect that Galicia had suffered during decades of 
centralised rule within the Spanish state. Spanish accession to the EEC in 1986 did not 
alter the basic tenets of the BNG’s antipathy to the European project. The highly 
damaging impact of the CAP and European fishing policies on a peripheral and under-
developed Galician economy provided the substance of the BNG’s anti-Europeanism 
until the early 1990s. Interestingly, developments that were viewed by other minority 
nationalist parties as heralding the dawn of a Europe the Regions – reform of the 
structural funds, the innovations of the Maastricht Treaty – were rejected by the BNG as 
nothing more than empty steps designed by state elites to placate peripheral nationalist 
demands. The TEU, for example, was denounced in typically forceful language as a 
“return to the third Napoleonic Empire, or a revival of the Romano-Germanic Empire 
or the fourth Reich”.
8  
 
Instead, the BNG’s “discovery” of a Europe of the Regions by the mid 1990s was 
rooted, first and foremost, in the changing electoral fortunes of the BNG from the mid 
1980s onwards. The party’s steadily increasing share of the vote in regional elections (in 
contrast to the failure of other smaller nationalist groups to command a similar electoral 
share) led to a consolidation of the nationalist political spectrum between 1991 and 1994, 
with the BNG incorporating several different communist and social-democratic groups 
into its organisation (Maíz, 2003; Barreiro Rivas, 2003). The fact that some of these 
groups – Unidade Galega in particular - espoused distinctly more Europeanist values 
than the BNG’s leadership had done hitherto, would ultimately have far-reaching 
consequences for the BNG’s own attitudes towards European integration. The 
emergence of a new pro-European elite within the BNG provided the substance for a 
distinctive European discourse rooted in the notion, as noted above, of Galician 
autonomy within a plurinational Spain and a Europe of the Peoples. That the BNG as a 
whole was receptive to these ideas from the mid 1990s onwards was the result of the 
party’s new aspirations to establish itself as the main party of opposition to the 
hegemonic party within the Galician Parliament throughout the 1990s, namely the 
Partido Popular de Galicia. As a part of the party’s new strategy, the BNG moderated 
not only its radical Marxist-leninist ideology, but also its conceptualisation of the centre-
periphery tension and how best to resolve it (Maíz, 2003). With regard to the latter, the 
radical language of “rupture” from an imperialist Spanish state was replaced by demands 
for greater Galician autonomy within an overarching state framework (Elias, 2006a: 
1622-3). This was complemented by the pursuit of new alliances with like minded parties, 
both within Spain (with the CiU in Catalonia and the PNV in the Basque Country) and 
on the supranational level, where the BNG became a member of EFA. While the BNG, 
by the mid 1990s, remained highly critical of many of the economic, political and social 
aspects of the EU, the party now framed these objections in a more constructive political 
discourse which made the link between Galician self-determination and a future 
                                                 
8 BNG (1992) O Tratado da Union Europea (TUE) Asinado en Maästricht. Análise e Posición Política do Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego. Santiago de Compostela: BNG, p. 5. 
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opposition to European integration was replaced by a formal commitment to a Europe 
of the Peoples, even if the EU as a concrete reality was a far cry from this normative 
ideal. 
 
However, it is important to note that this formal embrace of a regional Europe did not 
mean that fundamental attitudes towards European integration within the BNG had 
changed (Elias, 2006: 151). For many among the BNG’s rank and file, and even 
important figures among the party’s leadership, Europe was still a project viewed with 
deep-rooted scepticism, an indicator of the enduring influence of basic ideological values 
on the party’s general world-view. This observation highlights the strategic pragmatism 
of the BNG’s turn towards Europe, as a function of the requirements of domestic 
political competition. The impact of this limited internalisation of the BNG’s new 
European discourse on the party’s changing attitudes towards the EU in recent years is 
considered later on in this paper.  
 
 
RETHINKING SUPPORT FOR A EUROPE OF THE REGIONS 
 
Thus far, the paper has argued that the adoption of the rhetoric of a Europe of the 
Regions by Plaid Cymru and the BNG was more complex than simply being a response 
to developments on the supranational level, as is often asserted in existing academic 
accounts of minority nationalist party enthusiasm for a regional Europe. A consideration 
of party ideology and the domestic political context of the time provides a more 
complete explanation of these parties’ changing attitudes towards the European project. 
If this is the case, then it is reasonable to expect that more recent changes in the 
positions adopted by minority nationalist parties may also be a function of changes along 
these three dimensions of influence. The changing nature of European integration, and 
the repeated failure of supranational initiatives to move the EU towards a Europe of the 
Regions, have already been alluded to as a basis for increasing minority nationalist party 
cynicism about the concrete reality of European polity-building. But have changes in the 
ideological values and domestic political context of Plaid Cymru and the BNG further 
contributed to these parties’ rethinking of their position on European integration?  
 
Let us begin with the latter. If recent developments in European integration can explain 
the rise in minority nationalist party dissatisfaction with the current nature and direction 
of European integration, it is arguable that the declining salience of the European issue in 
the political discourses of Plaid Cymru and the BNG is the result of a very different set 
of pressures, arising from the domestic political arena within which these parties have 
mobilised and continue to operate. More specifically, the fact that the status of Plaid 
Cymru and the BNG within Welsh and Galician politics has changed in important ways 
during the last decade, has forced these two parties to reconsider the prominence given 
to the European dimension in the definition and articulation of their respective territorial 
projects. As noted above, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG “turned” to Europe when 
they were small parties in British and Galician politics respectively, and when they were 
both attempting to carve out a new political space within which to articulate the their 
territorial demands. The Europe of the Regions/Peoples rhetoric provided a valuable 
resource in achieving this aim, since the coupling of nationalist demands with a new 
political arena beyond the state served to redefine the terms of centre-periphery debate, 
ultimately bringing new legitimacy to minority nationalist demands for territorial 
autonomy. Ten years later, however, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG have established 
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establishment of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 created a new regional 
political space within which Plaid Cymru has become the main party of opposition and 
an aspiring party of regional government. In Galicia, the BNG’s improving electoral 
fortunes throughout the 1990s saw it replace the Galician Socialist Party as the second 
political force within the Galician Parliament in 1997, behind the right-wing Partido 
Popular de Galicia. After the 2005 Autonomous Elections, the BNG entered into 
coalition with the Socialists for the first time in its history.   
 
In short, the context within which Plaid Cymru and the BNG now view developments in 
European integration has changed fundamentally. More importantly, this change of 
status at home has brought its own challenges for the Europeanist commitments of these 
parties. Firstly, the unprecedented political visibility of these two parties has brought new 
pressure to defend a European vision that is increasingly out of sync with the concrete 
reality of European integration. This problem has been most acute for Plaid Cymru, 
since the party’s ideological commitment to a future Europe within which sovereignty is 
increasingly irrelevant is clearly at odds with the reassertion of state sovereignty within 
the EU in recent years. Plaid Cymru’s attempts to overcome this tension by replacing the 
demand for “full national status” within Europe with the call for “independence in 
Europe” has been undermined by the party’s persistent insistence that even 
“independence” would not ultimately mean Wales becoming as sovereign state as a 
precondition for membership of the EU (Elias, 2006b). For both Plaid Cymru and the 
BNG, hiding behind the loose rhetoric of a regional Europe is no longer an easy option 
when attempting to convince voters of the relevance and credibility of the territorial 
political project that defines the purpose of these parties.  
 
Secondly, it is no longer clear that the European dimension serves its purpose as a 
demarcator of political space for Plaid Cymru and the BNG in contemporary Welsh and 
Galician political arenas. Plaid Cymru’s championing of the European cause from the late 
1980s onwards was closely linked to the claim that it was the only true “party of Wales”, 
able to defend Welsh interests within British and European politics. Within post-
devolution Wales, however, one of the major problems that Plaid Cymru has faced has 
been that of maintaining a distinctive policy agenda in the face of the gradual re-
alignment of partisan politics within Wales post-1999. The establishment of the National 
Assembly of Wales created a new centre of gravity for all political parties in Wales. State-
wide parties were forced to discuss regional issues, produce regional solutions, and give 
their programmes a ‘Welsh face’ (Osmond, 2000; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2004). 
Moreover, all major political parties in Wales have become champions of better 
representation of Welsh interests within the EU. Plaid Cymru’s failure to define a clear 
political agenda in post-devolution Wales was a factor accounting for the party’s electoral 
decline in the second round of elections to the devolved body in 2003 (Wyn Jones and 
Scully, 2004). In short, it is no longer the case that a political programme anchored in the 
notion of “Wales in Europe” is an effective platform for presenting Plaid Cymru as a real 
political alternative for Wales.  
 
A similar dilemma is faced by the BNG in Galicia. Just as with Plaid Cymru, the BNG’s  
embrace of the discourse of European regionalism was intrinsically linked with the 
party’s attempt to define a new politics of alternatives in Galician. However, if this 
European dimension contributed to the BNG’s carving out of a new nationalist political 
space by the late 1990s, other political parties in Galicia – the state wide Partido Popular 
and Socialist Party - have also sought to compete with Galician minority nationalism on 
 10key issues of policy, although this process of adjustment has taken place over a longer 
period of time than in Wales (Máiz, 2003: 22-24; Jiménez Sánchez, 2003; Lagares Díez, 
2003). State-wide parties have taken on the political threat posed by the BNG by 
adopting offering their own version of a distinctly Galician political agenda. At the same 
time, the BNG’s adoption of a position of principled support for European integration 
has meant that it is no longer easy to distinguish between the pro-Europeanism of the 
BNG and that of other state-wide parties. The political and electoral advantages reaped 
by the party during the 1980s and early 1990s, as a result of being able to claim that it 
was the only critical Galician voice vis-à-vis European integration (Beramendi and Núñez-
Seixas, 1996: 295; Elias, 2006a: 181-182), no longer holds. The BNG’s struggle in recent 
years to define anew a distinctly “nationalist” political space has contributed to the 
party’s electoral decline since 2001, with new tensions emerging within the party over its 
policy priorities and political strategy. Just as for Plaid Cymru, Europe no longer provides 
an easy answer to the fundamental questions about party identity and purpose that the 
BNG has been struggling to answer in recent years.  
Thirdly, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG face a growing problem of espousing positions 
on European integration that are increasingly at odds with the attitudes of their voters on 
the European issue. This dilemma has assumed different forms in each of the two cases. 
In Wales, Plaid Cymru is faced with an increasingly Eurosceptic electorate, reflecting the 
increasing decline of support for European integration within the British public as a 
whole.
9 This makes things very difficult for any party seeking to gain public approval for 
closer integration into the EU. This lack of popular support for European integration 
may well become an even more problematic issue for Plaid Cymru in the future, as the 
party has to face up to the possibility that not only must it deal with a general popular 
disenchantment with European affairs, but that this opposition is particularly strong 
among some members of its traditional support base. Recent public opinion surveys, for 
example, asked respondents about Wales’s place within the UK and Europe (Welsh 
Assembly Election Studies, 1999; 2003). In 1999, 8.2% supported Plaid Cymru’s 
constitutional option, that is for Wales to become independent from the UK but remain 
a part of the UK, declining slightly to 7.8% by 2003. In contrast, support for Welsh 
independence both from the UK and the EU – the most radical option - more than 
doubled over the same period of time, from 2.9% in 1999 to 6.3% in 2003. Growing 
support among Plaid Cymru’s hard-line supporters for these two radical options in the 
future – independence from the UK and the EU – would represent a further challenge to 
a moderate nationalist agenda firmly rooted in a post-sovereigntist Europeanist vision of 
Wales’s future as an autonomous nation. 
 
For the BNG, the problem lies in the tension between the overwhelmingly pro-
European attitudes of the Galician electorate as a whole, in contrast to the deeply 
sceptical position of the BNG’s traditional support base. Sangrador Garcia (1996) noted 
that Galicia was slightly more pro-European than the Spanish average, a trend that is 
supported by more recent survey data. A question in the 2003 survey conducted by the 
Observatório Político Autonómico asked respondents in Galicia whether they considered 
European integration to be beneficial or prejudicial for their respective nation’s interests 
(OPA, 2003). Of the responses, 65.1% declared European integration to be beneficial for 
Galicia, with only around 10% expressing an opinion that European integration is 
prejudicial to Galicia; this was more supportive than respondents in either Catalonia, the 
Basque Country or Andalusia. When asked to evaluate Spain’s membership of the EU, 
                                                 
9 For an account of public attitudes towards European integration in Britain as a whole, see Spiering (2004).  
 1181.2% of Galician respondents saw this as something beneficial, in comparison to 70.4% 
in Catalonia and 74.2% in the Basque Country. The fact that the BNG’s campaign for a 
no vote in the referendum on the European Constitution elicited such little support 
among Galician voters – 81.3% of voters in Galicia were in favour of adopting the 
European Constitution, compared to 12.2% against – is indicative of the difficulties of 
selling a critical stance on European integration to an instinctively pro-European 
electorate. However, for the BNG’s membership, the ideological antipathy to European 
co-operation which shaped the party’s opposition to European integration for the first 
fifteen years of its existence, continues to translate into deep-rooted scepticism about the 
European project. The substantial drop in the BNG’s vote in the 2004 European 
Parliament elections – from 22% in 1999 to 13% - was explained by some party leaders 
as a rejection by the BNG’s voters of the party’s abandonment of its radical opposition 
to European integration, in favour of a more constructive pro-Europeanism (Elias, 
2006a: 180). This rejection of the party’s policies on Europe reflects a more general 
unease growing within the BNG at the apparent abandonment of core party values in 
pursuit of a bigger vote share and government office.  
 
For all of these reasons, the declining salience of the European issue for minority 
nationalist parties in Wales and Galicia can be understood as a tactic for diverting 
attention away from an issue that is increasingly difficult to defend in domestic political 
and electoral competitions. Instead, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG have preferred to 
focused on the bread and butter issues of policy-making within their respective 
territories. This is, in one sense, a natural reaction for parties that are, or are aspiring, 
participants in regional government. After all, European integration, for all the symbolic 
and concrete opportunities it seemed to offer minority nations, could never be a 
substitute to exercising political authority within the minority nation itself. In the words 
of one Plaid Cymru member, “Plaid Cymru is never going to be in power in Westminster 
or in Europe…We’re the main opposition party in the Assembly, and only Assembly 
elections will bring us self-determination”.
10 At the same time, however, the new 
preoccupation with developing comprehensive policy packages at home offers a 
convenient way of isolating the potentially damaging effects of a European discourse that 
has changed, over the course of ten years, from being an electoral vote-winner to being 
an electoral liability. The decreasing salience of the rhetoric of a regional Europe in 
minority nationalist party politics in Wales and Galicia is thus the result of calculated 
attempts by Plaid Cymru and the BNG to manage an abstract programmatic theme that 
is no longer appropriate for the supranational and domestic political contexts within 
which these parties strive to achieve national self-determination.   
 
Can one conclude from this that minority nationalist parties have turned their backs, 
once and for all, on the prospect of a Europe of the Regions? Answering this question 
requires one to consider the third factor that, as argued above, impacts upon minority 
nationalist party attitudes towards European integration, namely party ideology. Ideology 
is an enduring component of party identity that provides a prism through which real-
world developments are perceived and understood (Freeden, 1998; Volkens and 
Klingemann, 2002). With specific regard to European integration, there is growing 
empirical evidence that basic ideology constitutes the broad parameters of a political 
party’s attitude towards Europe, and that this influence is enduring over time (Marks, 
Wilson and Ray, 2002; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Hix, 
1999; Hix and Lord, 1997; Gabel and Hix, 2002; Ladrech, 2000). Given that minority 
                                                 
10 Interview, PC-03. 
 12nationalist parties mobilised historically around the centre-periphery cleavage, one would 
expect attitudes towards European integration to be determined, first and foremost, by 
their understanding of the centre-periphery cleavage, their relationship with the central 
state, and their proposals for modifying this constitutional set-up (Giordano and Roller, 
2002: 99). Minority nationalist parties who make an ideological link between European 
integration and the resolution of the centre-periphery dilemma are thus likely to be 
supportive of further European integration in principle, regardless of whether or not 
concrete developments in European integration meet the party’s normative aspirations 
for a future European polity. Where such an ideological basis for principled 
Europeanism is absent, then minority nationalist party support for European integration 
is more likely to be contingent upon other, shorter-term factors, such as developments 
on the supranational level and pressures emanating from the domestic political context. 
Given that neither of these latter factors would seem (at least from the Welsh and 
Galician cases) to be propitious for continued minority nationalist support for the 
rhetoric of a Europe of the Regions, then continued minority nationalist party support 
for European integration is likely to depend, in future, on the ideological rootedness of 
these parties’ professed Europeanism. 
 
These different propositions about the impact of party ideology on the future attitudes of 
minority nationalist party attitudes towards European integration suggest a very different 
prognosis about Plaid Cymru and the BNG’s positions on Europe in the medium term. 
Plaid Cymru’s support for European integration draws on a very long ideological 
tradition of conceptualising Welsh self-determination within a European framework. As 
such, continued support for European integration in principle is guaranteed; abandoning 
this commitment would be to violate one of the core determinants of the party’s identity. 
The EU as a concrete reality may be far from creating the kind of Europe aspired to by 
Plaid Cymru, creating a tension between this unsatisfactory reality and the party’s 
normative Europeanism. However, Plaid Cymru is likely to continue to package its long-
term constitutional demands in Europeanist terms for the forseeable future, even if this 
aspect of the party’s programme is not given prominence in the day-to-day politics of 
nation-building within Wales. With regard to the BNG, the party’s continued adherence 
to a regionalist vision of Europe is less guaranteed. In contrast, the strategic pragmatism 
of the BNG’s Europeanism, and the lack of rootedness of this ideal in the mindset of 
many of the party’s leaders and members, suggests that the party’s future attitude 
towards European integration may be open to contestation. In particular, as internal 
tensions within the BNG over the party’s ideological orientation and strategic priorities 
have increased over recent years, the BNG’s attitudes towards Europe may well depend 
on the outcome of an ongoing internal power struggle, between party traditionalists 
favouring a return to the more radical oppositional politics of the 1980s, and moderates 
who have overseen the BNG’s transformation into a party of the centre and a party of 
government over the recent decade. Whilst the latter’s ideological Europeanism defined 
the BNG’s turn towards Europe since the mid 1990s, the alternative is a re-emergence of 
the BNG’s principled opposition, not only to the EU as a concrete reality, but also to 
European integration in principle. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If developments in European integration from the mid 1980s onwards convinced many 
minority nationalist parties that a very different kind of Europe was being built – one 
that held the promise of new solutions for the centre-periphery dilemma within a Europe 
 13of the Regions – then more recent events on the supranational level have forced these 
parties to re-evaluate the degree to which European integration can satisfy minority 
nationalist demands for greater autonomy. However, this paper has argued that, despite 
evidence of a growing Euroscepticism among minority nationalist parties, it is not 
necessarily the case that minority nationalist parties will abandon their European 
regionalist aspirations completely. In the cases of Plaid Cymru and the BNG, for 
example, the re-assertion of state authority over the process and direction of European 
integration has not, to date, led minority nationalist parties to abandon their formal 
support for the European project. Rather, these two minority nationalist parties have 
sought to deal with the growing tension between support in principle for a Europe of the 
Regions and a EU which has failed to recognise the political and legal rights on small 
nations and historical regions, in a specific way, namely by playing down the European 
dimension to their nation-building rhetoric.  
 
It has been the contention of this paper that these recent changes in minority nationalist 
party attitudes towards European integration cannot be explained by the changing nature 
of European integration alone; minority nationalist party positions on Europe is not 
simply dependent on the degree to which European integration has created a Europe of 
the Regions. Rather, minority nationalist party support for European integration also 
depends on the party’s ideological orientation, and changes in the party’s domestic 
political context. An analysis of the different ways in which these three factors have 
interacted at different points in time provides a more sophisticated understanding of the 
ways in which minority nationalist parties perceive and respond to developments on the 
supranational level. The result is that, even though the shared discourse of a regionalist 
Europe adopted by many minority nationalist parties suggested a remarkable 
convergence of party attitudes around a single supranational theme, minority nationalist 
party attitudes towards European integration are also shaped by ideological and 
contextual factors that are specific to each party. This observation has important 
implications for the analysis of more recent changes in minority nationalist party attitudes 
towards Europe. Based on the case studies of Plaid Cymru and the BNG presented in 
this paper, it is arguable that the apparent decline in minority nationalist party support for 
European integration belies a more complex process by which these actors are 
attempting to reconcile developments on the supranational level with other ideological 
and contextual constraints that differ from party to party. To the extent that 
supranational and domestic conditions make it difficult to articulate a political 
programme anchored in the long-term aspiration for a regional Europe, the continued 
support of minority nationalist parties for European integration is likely to depend on the 
ideational commitment of these parties to such a project. Even where such a principled 
support for European integration exists, however, the fact remains that Europe no 
longer offers the easy route to self-determination it once promised. If... 
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